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DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE-JURISDICTION OVER NoNDOMImCILARY
SERVICE MEMBERS: TimE To ADOPT A NEW JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS
-In re Marriage of Ways, 85 Wn. 2d 693, 538 P.2d 1225 (1975);
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.030 (1976).
On November 30, 1973, Raymond A. Ways, a member of the
United States Navy on active military duty, filed a petition for
dissolution1 of marriage in a Washington superior court. Ways had
been stationed in Washington aboard the USS Enterprise (then un-
dergoing repairs at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton,
Washington) since October 1973, but neither he nor his wife had ever
been domiciled in Washington. 2 Ways -filed his petition in reliance
upon R.C.W. § 26.09.030, 3 a statute allowing members of the armed
forces stationed in Washington to petition for dissolution of marriage
in the state. On February 2, 1974, sixty-four days after the filing of
Ways' petition, the USS Enterprise departed for California, termi-
nating Ways' Washington station.4
1. The terms "dissolution" and "divorce" are used interchangeably in this note to
describe the termination of marital status by court proceeding. As used, the terms do
not connote the determination by the court of any ancillary matters such as child
custody, support, and property distribution.
2. The record makes no mention of Ways' domicile as of the date his petition
was filed, but the following information is gleaned from the briefs filed in the sub-
sequent Washington Supreme Court appeal. His wife and children were living in Vir-
ginia, where they had resided for the previous 14 years. Ways had last lived with his-
family in December 1972. Navy records indicated Ways' home of record as Silver-
springs, Maryland, but he had never resided there. Both spouses' automobiles were
registered in New Jersey. Ways also voted in New Jersey, although he had left that
state as a young man. While stationed in Washington, Ways resided aboard his ship.
His plans following the termination of his naval career were unclear. Brief for Re-
spondent at 1, Brief for Appellant at 1-2, In re Marriage of Ways, 85 Wn. 2d 693,
538 P.2d 1225 (1975).
3. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.09.030 (1976). The statute reads in relevant part as
follows:
When a party who is a resident of this state or who is a member of the armed
forces and is stationed in this state, petitions for a dissolution of marriage, and
alleges that the marriage is irretrievably broken and when ninety days have
elapsed since the petition was filed and from the date when service of summons
was made upon the respondent or the first publication of summons was made, the
court shall proceed as follows ....
4. The record fails to show whether Ways departed with his ship. The court evi-
dently presumed that he did, stating that Ways "ceased being stationed in Washington
when, on February 2, 1974, the USS Enterprise departed for the Alameda, California,
area." 85 Wn. 2d at 694, 538 P.2d at 1226.
The court in Ways defined "station" as "military post," citing United States v.
Phisterer, 94 U.S. 219, 222 (1877). 85 Wn. 2d at 697 n.1, 538 P.2d at 1228 n.1.
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Three days after the ship departed Washington, petitioner's wife
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Superior Court
for Kitsap County denied this motion.5 Respondent wife next peti-
tioned the Washington Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to re-
view the order denying the motion to dismiss and for a writ of prohi-
bition to bar further proceedings in the dissolution action.6 In a 5-4
decision, the Washington Supreme Court reversed. Held: Where a pe-
titioning member of the armed forces fails to remain continuously sta-
tioned in Washington for ninety days after filing the petition pursuant
to R.C.W. § 26.09.030, the superior court is without jurisdiction to
enter a decree of dissolution. In re Marriage of Ways, 85 Wn. 2d 693,
538 P.2d 1225 (1975).
Ways is the first Washington Supreme Court interpretation of this
portion of the state's Dissolution Act of 1973. 7 Prior to the enactment
of this statute, Washington law mandated one year's residency in the
state before filing for divorce.8 Residence under the divorce laws has
been interpreted by the Washington courts to mean domicile.9
In Ways the court was presented with the question of whether
R.C.W. § 26.09.030 could be upheld insofar as the statute authorizes
5. In re Marriage of Ways, No. 61691 (Wash. Super. Ct., Kitsap County. May 17.
1974).
6. Counsel for Mrs. Ways argued in the supreme court proceedings that an action
based on R.C.W. § 26.09.030 would deny her due process and equal protection under
the fourteenth amendment. It was further argued that such a proceeding would violate
art. 2, § 24, of the Washington constitution, which provides that "[t] he legislature
shall never grant any divorce." Brief for Appellant at 3. The court summarily dis-
missed the legislative divorce challenge, stating that the dissolution decree was "not
sought or expected from the legislature." 85 Wn. 2d at 695, 538 P.2d at 1226.
7. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.09 (1976).
8. See ch. 215, § 3, 1949 Wash. Laws 699 (repealed 1973). Under this statute a
court was without jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage if the plaintiff had not satisfied
the one-year residency requirement, even when the defendant could meet the require-
ment and had filed a cross-complaint for divorce. See Hargreaves v. Hargreaves, 55
Wn. 2d 856, 350 P.2d 867 (1960). A nonresident defendant could obtain a divorce
on cross-complaint, however, when a resident plaintiff filed the action. See Powell v.
Powell, 66 Wash. 561, 119 P. 1119 (1912).
9. Sasse v. Sasse, 41 Wn. 2d 363, 249 P.2d 380 (1952); Mapes v. Mapes, 24 Wn.
2d 743, 167 P.2d 405 (1946). Domicile, for the purpose of divorce jurisdiction, has
been defined by the Washington courts to mean physical presence in a state that co-
incides with an intention to make a permanent home in that state. See Thomas v.
Thomas, 58 Wn. 2d 377, 380, 363 P.2d 107, 109 (1961). The intention to establish
a home in the future in the state does not satisfy the intent requirement. Fiske v.
Fiske, 48 Wn. 2d 69, 73, 290 P.2d 725, 728 (1955); Freund v. Hastie, 13 Wn. App.
731, 734, 537 P.2d 804, 807 (1975). All persons are presumed to have a domicile
somewhere, and-once established-such domicile continues until another is acquired.
In re Moore's Estate, 68 Wn. 2d 792, 796, 415 P.2d 653, 656 (1966). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § § 11-23 (1971).
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Washington superior courts to issue dissolution decrees to members of
the armed forces not domiciled in the state. The court concluded that
domicile of one of the parties is not the only proper basis for dissolu-
tion jurisdiction;10 an adequate "jurisdictional nexus"" can also be
established when "either spouse has such a relationship to the state as
would make it reasonable for the state to dissolve the marriage.' 2
The majority decided that being stationed in Washington at the time
of filing is not a sufficient basis for divorce jurisdiction,' 3 but that an
adequate basis for jurisdiction does exist when a member of the armed
services remains continuously stationed in Washington from the time
of filing until the statutorily prescribed ninety-day waiting period has
elapsed.' 4 The court thus upheld R.C.W. § 26.09.030 by interpreting
it to confer jurisdiction to issue a decree of dissolution only where this
minimum requirement has been met.15 The four dissenting justices
disagreed, arguing that the Ways dissolution proceedings should be
continued and that the statute should be upheld without requiring any
jurisdictional basis other than that the service member be stationed in
Washington at the time of filing.' 6
Focusing on the questions presented in Ways, this note will discuss
the issue of jurisdiction of state courts to dissolve a marriage. The
legal background of divorce jurisdiction will be presented, including
discussion of the generally accepted domicile rule and its recognized
exceptions. The analysis of the jurisdictional facts issue presented in
the Ways decision will be critiqued, with the conclusion that the
statute as applied in Ways does not meet the requirements of due pro-
cess and may result in divorce decrees not entitled to recognition
under the full faith and credit clause. A suggested analytical approach
to these issues will be presented, emphasizing a reconsideration of the
10. 85 Wn. 2d at 700, 538 P.2d at 1230.
11. Id. at 699, 538 P.2d at 1229.
12. Id. at 698-99, 538 P.2d at 1229. This standard is taken directly from the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 72 (1971).
13. 85 Wn. 2d at 701-02, 538 P.2d at 1230.
14. Id. This post-filing, pre-findings period is commonly referred to as a "cooling-
off" period. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 13.4 (1968); Rieke, The Dissolution Act of 1973: From Status to Contract?, 49
WASH. L. REV. 375, 381 (1974). As Professor Clark states, "[t] he purpose behind
such statutes is to require a last-moment pause by the spouses before the final step is
taken which will end the marriage, in the hope that they will use this period for
attempts at reconciliation." H. CLARK, supra at 387.
15. 85Wn.2dat703,538P.2dat1231.
16. Id. at 703-04, 538 P.2d at 1231 (Brachtenbach, J., dissenting). Joining in the
dissent were Justices Finley, Rosellini, and Hunter.
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policy considerations that should influence a court's disposition of the
jurisdiction issue. Finally, a proposal for the application of choice of
law principles in dissolution actions will be presented as a solution to
the problems that remain under R.C.W. § 26.09.030 and other Amer-
ican divorce statutes.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Domicile Requirement
For historical reasons, an action to dissolve a marriage in an Amer-
ican court is properly viewed as a statutory proceeding.1 7 Because the
Constitution does not give the federal government any power to regu-
late domestic relations, the power to regulate marriage and divorce is
reserved to the states, with each state free to enact its own policy re-
garding the dissolution of marriage. 18 State statutes have varied
widely on the issue of the proper grounds for dissolving a marriage, 19
17. There is no common law or equity divorce jurisdiction. In England the ec-
clesiastical courts held exclusive jurisdiction to grant separations from bed and board
(divorce a ,nensa et thoro) until 1857. Prior to that date absolute divorce (divorce
a vinculo) was available only through Parliament. Such legislative divorces required
a prior divorce a inensa et thoro and could be obtained only at great expense. See I
W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 622-25 (3d ed. 1922).
Ecclesiastical courts were never established in this country, but the colonial and
state legislatures continued the practice of legislative divorce; the Supreme Court
upheld the validity of these special acts. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888)
(upholding legislative divorce granted to prominent early resident of Washington).
This practice was eliminated through the enactment of state constitutional provisions
barring legislative divorce. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. 2, § 24 ("The Legislature
shall never grant any divorce."). Separate maintenance decrees were granted by the
chancery courts under equity jurisdiction, but legislative acts were necessary to estab-
lish judicial power to issue divorce decrees. See, e.g., id. art. 4, § 6 ("The superior
court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases . . . of divorce, and for annulment
of marriage .... ). See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. at 206-09; Tupper v. Tupper.
63 Wn. 2d 585, 587-88, 388 P.2d 225, 227 (1964).
18. The Supreme Court recently described statutory regulation of domestic rela-
tions as "an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the
States." Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975).
19. For a compilation of the grounds for divorce in all the states as of June 1,
1974, see Freed, Grounds for Divorce in American Jurisdictions 8 FAM. L.Q. 401
(1974). As of that date the author listed five jurisdictions with "fault" grounds only
(i.e., marital misconduct) and fourteen states (including Washington) where "irre-
trievable breakdown" is the sole ground. The remaining states include various
"no-fault" grounds in their statutes, including incompatibility, living separate and
apart (for a period varying from six months in Vermont to five years in Rhode Is-
land), and conversion to an absolute divorce after living apart pursuant to a decree
ofjudicial separation or separate maintenance. Id. at 421-23.
Washington has gone further than any other state in limiting the role of the judge
in dissolution proceedings. Briefly stated, R.C.W. § 26.09.030 does not include a
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but the statutes have almost universally required that jurisdiction be
based on the domicile of at least one of the parties. 20
Although there is disagreement as to the origin of the require-
ment,2' the limitation of divorce jurisdiction to domiciliaries of the
forum state is clearly linked to the legal classification of inarriage as a
status.22 As Justice Field stated in Pennoyer v. Neff.23
provision allowing the judge to dismiss the petition on the basis of his or her finding
that the marriage is not irretrievably broken. Even when the respondent denies the
petitioner's allegation that the marriage is irretrievably broken, dismissal can be based
only upon a finding that the parties have agreed to a reconciliation. It is true that dis-
missal can be based upon a finding that the petitioner was induced to file the petition
by fraud or coercion; this dismissal, however, does not relate to the irretrievably
broken standard. In other jurisdictions that have adopted a "no-fault" standard, thejudge can dismiss the petition when he or she is not convinced that the marriage is in
fact irretrievably broken. For a more complete discussion of this aspect of the Wash-
ington statute, see Rieke, supra note 14. As Professor Rieke points out, in Washington
"[t] he determination to dissolve a marriage rests with the spouses, not with the
state." Id. at 378.
20. For the exceptions to this rule, see notes 44-48 and accompanying text infra.
The American Law Institute makes the following statement concerning the use of
the word "residence":
Statutes in the United States rarely speak in terms of domicil but use "residence",
instead. Residence is an ambiguous word whose meaning in a legal phrase must
be determined in each case. Frequently it is used in a sense equivalent to domicil.
On occasion it means something more than domicil, namely, a domicil at which
a person actually dwells. On the other hand, it may mean something else than
domicil, namely, a place where the individual has an abode or where he has set-
tled down to live for a period of time, but not necessarily with such an intention
of making a home there as to create a domicil. The phrase "legal residence" is
sometimes used as the equivalent of domicil.
In the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent, "residence" in a
statute is generally interpreted:
As being the equivalent of domicil in statutes relating to judicial jurisdic-
tion ....
As meaning a domicil at which the person in question actually dwells in
statutes relating to the competence of a divorce court ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11, Comment k (1971). See also
W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 14-15
(6th ed. 1971).
21. Tracing the history of the domicile requirement, Justice Frankfurter stated:
"The framers of the Constitution were familiar with this jurisdictional prerequisite,
and since 1789 neither this Court nor any other court in the English-speaking world
has questioned it." Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226,'229 (1945).
A different view was expressed by Judge Hastie in his dissenting opinion in Alton
v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 681 (3d Cir. 1953): "[T] he rule that divorce jurisdiction
will be exercised only by the courts of a state which has a domiciliary connection
with the spouses is a creation of nineteenth century American judges." Justice Clark
referred to the domicile requirements as "judge-made" and a "bugaboo." Granville-
Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 27 (1955) (dissenting opinion). These views,
opposing that of Justice Frankfurter, are supported in A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 238-40 (1962).
22. See 1 W. NELSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE 41 (1895); E. SPENCER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
311 (1911).
23. 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1878) (emphasis added).
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The jurisdiction which every State possesses, to determine the civil
status and capacities of all its inhabitants involves authority to pre-
scribe the conditions on which proceedings affecting them may be
commenced and carried on within its territory. The State, for example,
has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage
relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for
which it may be dissolved.
Additionally, early treatises indicate that dissolution actions were
viewed as based upon jurisdiction in rem. 24 The underlying analysis
was that the marital domicile was the situs of the marital status, or res,
and therefore had exclusive jurisdiction over actions affecting the
status. Once it became established that a married woman could ac-
quire a separate domicile, 25 however, the in rem label became a
source of confusion. 26 Nonetheless, the evolution of the doctrine of
divisible divorce 2 7 has resulted in a judicial approach whereby the
24. 1 W. NELSON, supra note 22, at 8, 13; E. SPENCER, supra note 22, at 311.
25. The American Law Institute presents the following explanation of the de-
velopment of the "divided domicile" concept:
The harshness of the common law rule that a married woman could have no
domicil apart from that of her husband . . . first became apparent in the field of
divorce. It was unfair that a deserted wife could bring suit for divorce only in
the state, however distant it might be, where her husband had chosen to establish
his new home. The first step in modifying the rule was to say that a husband,
once he had given his wife cause for divorce, no longer enjoyed the power to
change her domicil. Her domicil remained in the state where the spouses had
last lived together as man and wife, and accordingly the wife could there bring
suit for divorce or separate maintenance. The rule was then further liberalized by
permitting the wife under such circumstances to acquire a new domicil of her own
in any state where she might choose to go .... Gradually, the same power was
accorded the wife in situations where the spouses had separated by mutual con-
sent rather than because of the fault of the husband.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §21, Comment d (1971).
26. The confusion revolved around the issue of the validity of divorce decrees out-
side the divorcing state. Adoption of the divided domicile concept was accompanied by
judicial acceptance of ex parte divorce proceedings. The conceptual analysis was that
the marital status could be terminated in the plaintiff's state of domicile and that per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant in a proceeding in rem was not required. See E.
SPENCER, su pra note 22, at 318-19. The state courts adopted conflicting policies con-
cerning the extraterritorial validity of these ex parte decrees, see id., and the Supreme
Court finally was forced to decide the question under the full faith and credit clause.
See note 35 infra.
27. In Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948), the Court held that the full faith and
credit clause did not foreclose New York from continuing to enforce a separate main-
tenance decree that had been awarded to a New York resident before her husband
obtained a valid ex parte divorce in Nevada. Justice Douglas explained:
The result in this situation is to make the divorce divisible-to give effect to the
Nevada decree insofar as it affects marital status and to make it ineffective on the
issue of alimony. It accommodates the interests of both Nevada and New York in
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termination of the marital status is "treated as if it were in rem, while
termination of the incidents is treated as if in personam."28
The U.S. Supreme Court has never been squarely presented with
the question of whether a state dissolution statute not requiring juris-
diction to be based on the domicile of at least one of the parties could
be upheld. The leading federal case on this issue is Alton v. Alton,29
where the Court of Appeals for the Third .Circuit held that it was a
violation of due process for the Virgin Islands to issue a divorce where
neither party was domiciled in that territory.30 The Supreme Court
vacated the appeal as moot, based upon a finding that the parties had
obtained a divorce in their state of domicile subsequent to the court of
appeals decision.31 The Supreme Court frequently has asserted by way
the broken marriage by restricting each state to the matters of her dominant con-
cern.
Id. at 549. The divisible divorce doctrine was expanded in Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,
354 U.S. 416 (1957), where the Court held that it was consistent with full faith and
credit for New York to award alimony to one of its residents, even though her hus-
band had previously obtained a valid ex parte divorce in Nevada. But see Simons v.
Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank, 381 U.S. 81 (1965) (husband's ex parte Florida divorce
could terminate wife's dower right in Florida real estate). See Currie, Suitcase Divorce
in the Conflict of Laws: Simons, Rosenstiel, and Borax, 34 U. CI. L. REV. 26
(1966); Comment, Divorce Ex Parte Style, 33 U. Cm. L. RE. 837 (1966). On the
topic of divisible divorce, see generally H. CLARK, supra note 14, § 11.4; R. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 184-87 (1971).
In Perry v. Perry, 51 Wn. 2d 358, 318 P.2d 968 (1957), the Washington Supreme
Court refused to give effect to a Massachusetts separate maintenance decree entered
prior to the husband's ex parte Washington divorce decree. Professor Clark states that
Perry is an example of a decision that "erroneously refuses to follow Estin." H. CLARK,
supra note 14, § 11.4, at 315 n.12.
28. H. CLARK, supra note 14, § 11.4, at 316 (1968).
29. 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 965 (1954).
30. The Alton case involved an attempt to obtain a divorce under a newly enacted
Virgin Islands divorce law creating a statutory presumption of domicile when the party
seeking the divorce had been physically present in the Virgin Islands for six weeks. The
statute also provided that jurisdiction could be based on personal jurisdiction over both
the parties, without any further reference to domicile. Mrs. Alton met the six-week
requirement; Mr. Alton appeared, but did not contest the divorce. The federal district
court judge refused to grant the divorce, however, on the ground that the statute was
unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed in a 4-3 decision.
The decision in Alton has been criticized as a misapplication of the due process
clause. This conclusion stems from the observation that the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments direct that no person be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due proc-
ess of law. In Alton the defendant appeared in court and did not then or later complain
that he had been denied due process. Thus, no person could properly be said to have
been denied due process. See Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d at 680 (Hastie, J., dissenting);
Wheat v. Wheat, 229 Ark. 842, 318 S.W.2d 793, 796 (1958); Rheinstein, The Consti-
tutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 779 (1955).
31. 347 U.S. 965 (1954). In Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955),
the Court was presented with the same issue as in Alton, but once again avoided a
decision on the constitutional issue by holding that the Virgin Islands legislature had
exceeded its congressional grant of power by enacting the divorce statute in question.
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of dicta, however, that divorce jurisdiction must be based on domi-
cile. 32
Closely related to the jurisdiction issue is the question of when a
dissolution decree is entitled to recognition under the full faith and
credit clause. 33 Recognition of a dissolution decree outside the forum
state most commonly becomes an issue when one spouse departs the
marital domicile, establishes a domicile in another state, and then
obtains a divorce in an ex parte proceeding. 34 The leading cases on
the validity of such a decree for recognition purposes are the two deci-
sions of Williams v. North Carolina.35 In Williams I the Court held
32. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945) (Frankfurter.
J.) ("Under our system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly
speaking-is founded on domicil."). This oft-quoted dictum was repeated with ap-
proval by Justice Rehnquist, also by way of dicta, in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393. 407
(1975).
33. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, provides as follows:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved.
and the Effect thereof.
Congressional action pursuant to this provision is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970).
34. See Comment, Divorce Ex Parte Style, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 837. 837 (1966). In
his dissenting opinion in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942). Justice
Jackson noted that in an ex parte divorce "settled family relationships may be destroyed
by a procedure that we would not recognize if the suit were one to collect a grocery
bill." Id. at 316 (footnote omitted).
35. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Wil-
liams 1]; Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945) [hereinafter cited as Wil-
liams 11]. The Williams decisions are based on the following chain of events: After
residing in North Carolina for several years with their respective spouses, Mr. Williams
and Mrs. Hendrix departed together for Las Vegas, Nevada. They spent six weeks in
the Alamo Auto Court, thus satisfying Nevada's pre-filing residency requirement, and
then each filed for divorce in the Nevada courts. The divorce decrees were issued in
ex parte proceedings; the absent spouses were served by registered mail and publica-
tion, but neither entered an appearance. The two were married in Nevada on the day
that the latter of the two divorces was granted, and they immediately departed for
North Carolina. Upon their return they were charged and convicted of bigamous co-
habitation. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the convictions, and the
issue on certiorari to the Supreme Court was whether the convictions were invalid for
failure to give full faith and credit to the Nevada divorce decrees. In Williams I the
Court reversed and remanded, holding that the divorce decrees were entitled to recog-
nition in North Carolina insofar as they were based on the domicile of the divorce-
seeking parties. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, took pains to point out that
there was "no question on the present record whether a divorce decree granted by the
courts of one state to a resident as distinguished from a domiciliary is entitled to full
faith and credit in another state." 317 U.S. at 302.
On remand the North Carolina court once again convicted, but specifically based itsjudgment on a finding that at the time the divorce decrees were issued the defendants
had not acquired bona fide domicile in Nevada. These convictions were upheld in Wil-
liams I, with the majority (per Justice Frankfurter) ruling that the North Carolina
courts were not foreclosed from reexamining the jurisdictional basis of the Nevada
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that any dissolution decree issued where jurisdiction was based on the
domicile of the petitioning party is entitled to recognition under the
full faith and credit clause.36 This rule was qualified by the decision in
Williams II, where the Court held that the judgment need not be rec-
ognized if the attacking party can successfully disprove the jurisdic-
tional fact of domicile.37 In subsequent decisions, however, the Court
held that this possibility of collateral attack may be lost under the
doctrine of res judicata if the attacking party participated in the orig-
inal proceedings. 38 The courts have also invoked various theories of
decrees: "Otherwise, as was pointed out long ago, a court's record would establish its
power and the power would be proved by the record." 325 U.S. at 234.
36. Williams I expressly overruled Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906) (ex
parte decree issued by plaintiff's state of domicile not entitled to recognition where
divorcing state was not the matrimonial domicile). The Court rejected matrimonial
domicile as a troublesome concept requiring the court to determine which party was at
fault and often resulting in decrees not entitled to recognition. 317 U.S. at 300-01.
37. The divorcing state's determination of domicile is entitled to a presumption of
validity, however, and the attacking party bears the burden of disproving the previous
jurisdictional finding. See Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126, 128 (1951).
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the question of whether a divorce decree sub-
sequently refused recognition still has validity in the rendering state. In Colby v. Colby,
78 Nev. 150, 369 P.2d 1019, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962), the Nevada court
refused to vacate a Nevada ex parte divorce decree that had been held void in a Mary-
land separation suit, even though Maryland had personaljurisdiction over both parties.
In Sutton v. Leib, 188 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1951), the court of appeals decided such
a decree was still valid in the rendering state, citing dicta in various Supreme Court
decisions. Id. at 768. The Supreme Court reversed this decision on other grounds, 342
U.S. 402 (1952), but expressly rejected the court of appeals' conclusion on the internal
validity question. Id. at 409. See also Rodgers & Rodgers, The Disparity Between Due
Process and Full Faith and Credit: The Problem of the Somewhere Wife, 67 COLuM.
L. REV. 1363, 1364 (1967) (concluding that decree refused recognition may still be
valid in rendering state). But see Rheinstein, supra note 30, at 817-24; Sumner, Full
Faith and Credit for Divorce Decrees-Present Doctrine and Possible Changes, 9 VAND.
L. REV. 1, 14 (1955).
38. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948) (husband could not collaterally attack
Florida decree where he had participated in the proceedings but failed to contest juris-
dictional fact of domicile of wife in Florida). In Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948), a
companion case to Sherrer, the Court held that the issue of jurisdiction is also resjudicata where the defendant concedes the jurisdiction of the court.
In Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951), the Court held that collateral at-
tack by third parties is also barred if such attack is barred by the law of the divorcing
state. In Johnson an attack by a child of one of the parties to the divorce was held to
be barred, on the ground that the law of the divorcing state would not allow such an
attack. And, in Cook v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951), the jurisdictional issue was held
to be res judicata as to a subsequent spouse of one of the parties, once again on the
basis of the law of the divorcing state.
In In re Englund's Estate, 45 Wn. 2d 708, 277 P.2d 717 (1954), the Washington
Supreme Court ruled that a stranger to the divorce decree cannot collaterally attack its
validity unless the decree "affected some right or interest which he had acquired prior
to its rendition." Id. at 715, 277 P.2d at 721. In many other states third parties are
allowed to attack the decree, regardless of-when their interests accrued. See, e.g., Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Porter, 324 Mass. 581, 88 N.E.2d 135 (1949). For a compilation
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estoppel to prevent collateral attack.39
In the Williams decisions the necessity of conditioning recognition
upon domicile was explained in terms of policy rather than doctrine.
Rejecting the in rem classification of divorce actions, 40 the Williams I
Court defended the domicile requirement as necessary in light of the
"rightful and legitimate concern" of each state, as a sovereign, for the
marital status of persons domiciled within its borders. 41 Noting that
the institution of marriage touches "basic interests of society, '42 the
Court in Williams 11 explained that "[d] omicile implies a nexus be-
tween person and place of such permanence as to control the creation
of legal relations and responsibilities of the utmost significance." 43
of cases involving issues of collateral attack not yet decided by the Supreme Court.
see C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 1047-48
(2d ed. 1976).
It is important to note that the Sherrer principle applies only to collateral attack
upon the termination of the marital status. Ancillary matters, such as custody. alimony.
and support, cannot be conclusively settled by a court unless it has personal jurisdic-
tion over both of the parties. See note 27 supra.
39. The Supreme Court held in Johnson v. Muelberger. 340 U.S. 581 (1951). that
under the full faith and credit clause the law of the divorcing state must be used to
determine whether collateral attack on the decree will be allowed. Regarding the ques-
tion of estoppel, however, the forum state is free to apply its own law, usually without
regard to the law of the state that issued the divorce decree. For an extensive discussion
of the various theories of estoppel to attack divorce decrees applied in American juris-
dictions, see H. CLARK, supra note 14, § 11.3.
Two Washington cases should be noted. In Wampler v. Wampler. 25 Wn. 2d 258.
170 P.2d 316 (1946), the court held that a party who procures a divorce decree in an-
other state is not estopped to assert its invalidity in a subsequent action to adjudicate
the sole issue of marital status. But in In re Tamke's Estate, 32 Wn. 2d 927. 204 P.2d
526 (1949), the court held that the rule in Wainpler does not apply when the party is
asserting the invalidity of the decree in order to gain a "private right"--there, the right
of a woman to administer the estate of a man from whom she had gained a Nevada
divorce.
For a discussion of the application of equitable estoppel principles to the question of
the continuing validity of a decree refused recognition, see Rosenberg, How Void Is a
Void Decree, or The Estoppel Effect of Invalid Divorce Decrees, 8 FAM. L.Q. 207
(1974).
40. 317 U.S. at 297.
41. Id. at 298. See also Rieke. supra note 14. at 379 ("The question is not whether
the public has an interest in marriage contracts but whether 'the state is a third party
whose interests take precedence over the private interests of the spouses. "') (Quoting
Posner v. Posner. 233 So. 2d 381. 383 (Fla. 1970)).
42. 325 U.S. at 230.
43. Id. at 229. With recognition hinging upon domicile under the Williams decisions.
many commentators have concluded that the requirements of due process and full
faith and credit are coextensive in dissolution actions. See Rodgers & Rodgers. supra
note 37, at 1370 & n.56 (listing "distinguished authorities [who] have expressed the
view that the jurisdictional criteria relevant to the two great clauses are identical").
Professors von Mehren and Trautman state:
Jurisdiction to adjudicate and recognition of foreign judgments are not merely
different ways of formulating a single problem; they are separate. though inter-
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B. Other Bases for Dissolution Jurisdiction
There are recognized exceptions to the domicile requirement. Ar-
kansas statutes require only a showing of residency, defined as phys-
ical presence in the state for a minimum of three months.44 The Ar-
kansas Supreme Court has upheld the statute,45 but in some cases the
courts of other states have refused to re.cognize Arkansas dissolution
decrees. 46
Several states have enacted statutes granting access to the divorce
courts to members of the armed forces stationed in the state for a pre-
scribed length of time, with no requirement of any showing of domi-
cile. 47 State courts have upheld these statutes,48 and there are no re-
related, questions. In the United States the two issues have tended to coalesce be-
cause the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution is taken to requirejurisdiction in the rendering state court as a prerequisite to compulsory recognition
in other states.
von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV.
L. REV. 1121, 1126 (1966).
44. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1208 to 1208.1 (1962). But in Graham v. Graham,
254 Ark. 646, 495 S.W.2d 144 (1973), the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the
petitioning spouse had not satisfied the statutory requirement of residence upon a show-
ing that he had lived in a motel room in Arkansas, maintained a Louisiana mailing
address, and had visited Louisiana several times during his alleged period of residence.
See also note 20 supra.
45. Wheat v. Wheat, 229 Ark. 842, 318 S.W.2d 793 (1958) (reversing lower court
ruling that the statute was unconstitutional). In the course of its discussion the Arkan-
sas court expressly rejected the notion that due process requires domicile to be the sole
basis for the exercise of divorce jurisdiction. 318 S.W.2d at 797. As to the question of
full faith and credit, the court conceded that under Williams I a decree issued on a
basis other than domicile might be refused recognition in other states, but argued that
the full faith and credit clause did not affect the internal validity of the decree. Id. at
796. See also 58 MICH. L. REV. 128 (1959); 12 VAND. L. REV. 924 (1959).
46. See Ford v. Ford, 286 So. 2d 385 (La. App. 1973) (Arkansas decree not en-
titled to recognition where petitioner lived in hotel in Arkansas but commuted to work
in Louisiana each day); Winters v. Winters, 111 So. 2d 418 (Miss. 1959) (Arkansas
decree not entitled to recognition where petitioner returned to Mississippi immediately
upon receiving decree). But see Reeves v. Reeves, 209 So. 2d 554 (La. App. 1968)(husband could not collaterally attack Arkansas divorce decree where he had filed an
appearance in the Arkansas proceeding).
47. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-312 (1976); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-349
(1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-4 (Supp. 1975); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 3.23(Vernon 1975). These statutes are based upon an apparent recognition of the difficul-
ties service members often encounter when seeking to establish, change, or prove their
place of domicile. See Lauterbach v. Lauterbach, 392 P.2d 24, 26 (Alas. 1964); W.
REESE & M. ROSENBERG, supra note 20, at 43-44; 28 WASH. L. REV. 161 (1953).
Another rationale was stated as follows by the Texas Supreme Court in Wood v.
Wood, 159 Tex. 350, 320 S.W.2d 807, 811 (1959):
The State of Texas is hardly less concerned with the domestic relations of persons
required to live in this state indefinitely under military orders, oftentimes for a
period of years, with the protection and support of their children and their property
interests, and the adjustment of their marital responsibilities at stake than it is
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ported cases involving nonrecognition of decrees issued to service
members under these statutes.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws states: "A state has
power to exercise judicial jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage of
spouses, neither of whom is domiciled in the state, if either spouse has
such a relationship to the state as would make it reasonable for the
state to dissolve the marriage. '49 The Restatement further provides
that "few definite statements can be made as to what relationships
with a state, other than domicile, will suffice," but residence by one of
the spouses in a state for a "substantial period, such as a year," is sug-
gested as an adequate jurisdictional basis. 50
For several years legal scholars have favored the proposition that
domicile of one of the parties is not an absolute prerequisite to divorce
jurisdiction. 51 Noting the difficulties inherent in the domicile con-
cept,52 the commentators have suggested various alternative juris-
with the similar problems of those who have acquired a domicil here in the ortho-
dox sense. In many cases, if not in the majority, the courts of this state only can
deal adequately with these problems and afford appropriate relief.
See also Lauterbach v. Lauterbach, 392 P.2d at 26.
48. Lauterbach v. Lauterbach, 392 P.2d 24 (Alas. 1964); Craig v. Craig, 143 Kan.
624, 56 P.2d 464 (1936); Wallace v. Wallace, 63 N.M. 414. 320 P.2d 1020 (1958);
Wood v. Wood, 159 Tex. 350, 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959). Each of these cases held that
divorce jurisdiction could be based upon the satisfaction of a statutory requirement
of one year of continuous stationing in the state by a nondomiciliary member of the
armed services.
49. §72(1971).
50. Id., Comment b.
51. See, e.g., Leflar, Conflict of Laws and Family Law, 14 ARK. L. REV. 47
(1959-60); Stimson, Jurisdiction in Divorce Cases: The Unsoundness of the Domicil-
iary Theory, 42 A.B.A.J. 222 (1956); Sumner, supra note 37, at 12-19.
52. Perhaps the most effective criticism of the domicile requirement was presented
by Judge Hastie, dissenting in Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953). vacated as
moot, 347 U.S. 965 (1954), where he argued that domicile is a "highly technical con-
cept depending upon the proof of the mental attitude of a person toward a place." Id.
at 682-83. He further stated that the use of domicile as the exclusive basis for divorce
jurisdiction rested upon the presumption of "a stable and intimate attachment of both
spouses to a single community which in fact and alone has a genuine interest in their
relationship." Id. at 682. He disputed the validity of this presumption in our "in-
creasingly mobile" society, wherein "community attachments [are] less intimate and
less lasting than heretofore." Id.
Judge Hastie further pointed out that quite often spouses establish separate dom-
iciles after estrangement. Noting that under Williams I a state may properly base
divorce jurisdiction upon the domicile of one of the parties, he argued that the divided
domicile concept allows the divorcing state to completely ignore the domestic policy
of the other state, as well as the interest of the absent spouse. Id. at 683. Arguing
that the domicile concept "exaggerates the theoretical interest of the technical domicil
of the plaintiff" at the expense of the absent spouse, Judge Hastie concluded that the
concept had become a "potential source of injustice." Id. at 683.
Another common criticism of the domicile requirement is that it encourages per-
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dictional bases, including the place where the marriage was pro-
nounced, 53 personal jurisdiction over the parties, 54 and the previously
mentioned residency and military station grounds. 55
II. THE DECISION IN WAYS
The first step in the majority's reasoning in Ways was to reject the
notion that domicile of one of the parties is an absolute prerequisite
for dissolution jurisdiction.56 The court reasoned that domicile implies
a relationship between person and place, termed this relation the juris-
dictional nexus,57 and concluded that a sufficient nexus is also assured
under the Restatement test,58 i.e., "either spouse has such a relation to
the state as would make it reasonable for the state to dissolve the mar-
riage."59
The court's decision to accept a jurisdictional nexus other than
domicile was clearly justified. The doctrinal arguments previously
advanced in support of the domicile requirement have been discred-
ited by the courts and commentators.6 0 Furthermore, it has been
shown that in many cases the domicile requirement defeats the very
policy interests that the concept is said to protect.61 The need for al-
jury on the question of intent to remain permanently in the forum state. See Granville-
Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1955) (Clark, J., dissenting). See also
Currie, supra note 27, at 26.
53. New York law previously authorized divorce jurisdiction on this basis. For a
defense of this approach, see David-Zieseness v. Zieseness, 205 Misc. 836, 129 N.Y.S.2d
649 (1954) (state statute giving courts jurisdiction to dissolve marriage where parties
were married within state is constitutional). See also Sumner, supra note 37, at 21.
54. See Sumner, supra note 37, at 16 (suggesting that physical presence of parties
can be combined with new choice of law rule as alternative basis for jurisdiction).
See also Currie, supra note 27, at 48; notes 92-105 infra.
But see Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d 236 (1948) (personal jurisdic-
tion over parties not constitutionally permissible basis for divorce jurisdiction, unless
one party was domiciled in state). See also Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903)
(decree issued by court having personal jurisdiction over both parties not entitled to
recognition where neither spouse was domiciled in divorcing state).
55. See notes 44-48 and accompanying text supra.
56. 85 Wn. 2d at 698-99, 538 P.2d at 1228.
57. Id. at 699, 538 P.2d at 1229.
58. Id.
59. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
60. See notes 21-25, 30, 44-55 and accompanying text supra.
61. See notes 40-43 and accompanying text supra. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in
Williams II, noted that there are strong arguments favoring a restriction of divorce
actions to states having a substantial relation to the marriage, but equally strong argu-
ments favoring transient actions for individuals seeking the benefit of "liberal" divorce
policies. He concluded that the domicile requirement, as presently applied, compro-
mised both of these interests. 325 U.S. at 256-57.
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ternative jurisdictional bases is also supported by the discriminatory
effect of the domicile requirement upon members of the armed forces
stationed outside their state of domicile. 62
The majority next turned to the Washington statute, interpreting it
to contain a ninety-day post-filing stationing requirement. The ma-
jority adopted this strained, if not unjustified, construction of R.C.W.
§ 26.09.03063 on the premise that, as interpreted, the statute would
62. See note 47 supra.
It may be significant that R.C.W. § 26.09.030 requires only that the service member
be "stationed" in Washington. Military stationing orders are designated as either tem-
porary (TDY) or permanent (PCS). A permanent change of station may be of un-
certain duration, and as a general rule PCS orders authorize dependents and personal
belongings to be moved at government expense. Temporary duty, on the other hand.
may be assigned only up to a maximum of 180 days. and TDY orders generally do
not authorize the movement of dependents or personal belongings. Interview with
Chief Petty Officer Carstensen. Military Pay Supervisor. HQ 13th Naval District, in
Seattle. Washington (Feb. 7, 1977).
A service member on TDY orders to a Washington station will establish only a
slight nexus with this state. Presently, however, it is possible for a member of the
armed forces to petition for dissolution of marriage on his or her day of arrival in
this state and be entitled to a decree if the temporary duty extends for 90 days after
the date of filing. Such a result does not seem to accord with the principle of limiting
dissolution actions to those persons having a "reasonable relation" to the state.
63. The majority in Ways asserted that R.C.W. § 26.09.030 was "somewhat am-
biguous." 85 Wn. 2d at 701, 538 P.2d at 1230. Justice Brachtenbach. writing for the
four dissenting justices, stated: "Contrary to the majority opinion. I find nothing
ambiguous in the statute." Id. at 704, 538 P.2d at 1231. On the face of the statute.
see note 3 supra, it would appear that the dissent is correct. Clearly the service mem-
ber must be stationed in Washington when filing the petition, but beyond this require-
ment the statute does not in any way qualify the procedures following the filing of the
petition. The statute does not mention any sort of continuing requirement of either
stationing or physical presence.
The majority further stated that the statute "appears to be an adaptation of section
302(a)(1) of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act." 85 Wn. 2d at 701, 538 P.2d at
1230. Section 302 of the 1970 version of that Act (current when the Dissolution Act
of 1973 was drafted) differs from R.C.W. § 26.09.030 in that it explicitly states that
the court must find that "one of the parties has been a resident of this state, or is a
member of the armed services who has been stationed in this state, for 90 days next
preceding the commencement of the proceeding or the entry of the decree." The
Uniform Act is also distinguishable in that it applies the 90-day requirement to resi-
dents as well as to service members stationed in the state. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE ACT § 302(a)(1) (1970 version).
It is submitted that the Uniform Act does not decisively indicate legislative intent.
If the drafters of the Washington statute were referring to section 302, one must
assume that they deliberately changed the language to avoid the 90-day stationing re-
quirement. Moreover. R.C.W. § 26.09.030 is substantially different from section 302
in scope; for instance, the Washington statute makes provision for transfer of the cause
to the family court, or for counseling at the request of one of the parties or at the
court's direction. Section 302 of the Uniform Act contains no similar provisions.
These fundamental differences between the two acts indicate that the Uniform Act
was used as a reference rather than a guide.
In defense of the court, it should be noted that the Dissolution Act contains no
severance clause. Thus, the court was faced with the choice of either invalidating the
entire statute or adopting a construction that required what the majority believed to
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require an adequate jurisdictional nexus.64 The court supported this
premise by referring to the pre-filing residency requirements com-
monly employed in state dissolution statutes,65 and the ninety-day pe-
riod specified in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.66 What the
court did not adequately discuss, however, was how or why ninety
days' presence in the state satisfied the newly adopted "reasonable re-
lation" test. Certainly there are factors other than the length of one's
residence that are at least equally relevant when evaluating the rela-
tion between a state and one seeking dissolution of a marriage. Ob-
vious candidates for consideration include the location of the petition-
er's property, children, and creditors.
The majority also failed to explain adequately why the ninety-day
jurisdictional nexus would avoid the problem of nonrecognition in the
courts of other states. No case authority was cited, and the Williams
decisions, 67 as well as recent Supreme Court dicta,68 suggest that di-
vorce jurisdiction must be based on domicile in order to be assured
recognition under the full faith and credit clause.6 9 Additionally, the
be an adequate jurisdictional nexus.
The 1974 version of section 302 of the Uniform Act (drafted subsequent to the
drafting of the Washington Dissolution Act of 1973) reads in relevant part as follows:
(a) The... court shall enter a decree of dissolution of marriage if:
(1) the court finds that one of the parties, at the time the action was com-
menced, was domiciled in this State, or was stationed in this State while a
member of the armed services, and that the domicil or military presence has
been maintained for 90 days next preceding the making of the findings ....
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 302(a)(1) (1974 version), reprinted in M.
PAULSEN & W. WADLINGTON, STATUTORY MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 13 (2d ed. 1974).
This version differs from the 1970 Act in that the 90-day period must be satisfied after
filing the petition, thus eliminating the option available under the previous draft.
The court in Ways rejected the notion that R.C.W. § 26.09.030 contained a 90-day
continuous physical presence requirement that could be used as a nexus for jurisdic-
tion. 85 Wn. 2d at 701 n.2, 538 P.2d at 1230 n.2. But see WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.150
(1976) (no sooner than six months after entry of a decree of legal separation, upon
motion of either party, the superior court shall convert the separation decree to a
decree of dissolution of marriage).
64. 85 Wn. 2d at 700-02, 538 P.2d at 1230-31.
65. 2i. at 699, 538 P.2d at 1229. See also note 47 supra. It should be noted that,
when employed in connection with a requirement of domicile, a pre-filing residency
requirement may be interpreted to be nonjurisdictional. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393, 418 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Hammond v. Hammond, 45 Wn. 2d 855,
278 P.2d 387 (1954) (interpreting Idaho law). See also H. CLARK, supra note 14,
§ 11.2, at 285 n.1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 70, Comment d
(1971).
The constitutionality of a one-year pre-filing residency requirement was upheld in
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
66. See note 63 supra.
67. See notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra.
68. See note 32 supra.
69. The recognition issue has been approached cautiously in the other decisions
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court did not discuss the underlying motive for nonrecognitior
interest of another state in applying its own social policy to the
riage. Such an interest would appear to be a distinct possibility uncat:
a law requiring no contact between the state and the marriage beyond
the petitioner's presence for ninety days.
The shallow analysis presented under the reasonable relation test
appears to be a result of previous judicial experience with the domicile
requirement. Both jurisdiction and recognition have hinged upon this
single determination without consideration of other underlying fac-
tors.7 0 Furthermore, under the divided domicile concept7' the courts
have been plaintiff-oriented, restricting their analysis of the jurisdic-
tional nexus to the relation of one party, usually the petitioner, to the
state.72 It is undoubtedly true that in the ordinary dissolution action,
with both spouses domiciled in the forum state, there is no real need
to investigate further the relation of the parties to the state. But when
the forum state is the domicile of only one of the spouses, or when ju-
risdiction is based on a nondomiciliary standard such as ninety days'
presence in the state, there is no longer any assurance that the "rea-
sonable relation" will in fact exist.
The Ways proceedings present an excellent example of the undesir-
able results that may be achieved under R.C.W. § 26.09.030. If the
petitioner had remained stationed in Washington an additional twenty-
six days, the statutory requirements would have been met, thus giving
a Washington superior court jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage.
Under prevailing judicial policy Washington law would have been
upholding statutes with nondomiciliary bases for divorce jurisdiction. In Wallace v.
Wallace, 63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020, 1023-24 (1958), the New Mexico court ap-
peared to rely on the fact that the defendant had appeared, thus protecting the decree
from collateral attack by the defendant under the rule ofSherrer v. Sherrer. 334 U.S.
343 (1948). In Lauterbach v. Lauterbach, 392 P.2d 24 (Alas. 1964). the Alaska court
did not discuss the recognition issue. In Wood v. Wood. 159 Tex. 350, 320 S.W.2d
807, 810-11 (1959), the Texas court distinguished the Williams decisions by noting
that the rendering state's (Nevada's) statute also required domicile. The Texas court
also expressed confidence that decrees issued under the statute would be entitled to
recognition on the grounds that one year of continuous military presence implied a
relation or nexus that was the equivalent of domicile. 320 S.W.2d at 811.
It may be significant that a statutory requirement of one year of continuous station-
ing insures that the armed forces member is on permanent duty in the state. See note
62 supra. On the other hand, a service member may be on temporary orders for more
than 90 days and can therefore meet the Washington statutory requirement.
70. See note 52 supra.
71. See note 25 supra.
72. See note 52 supra.
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applied73 without any further consideration of the state's connection
with the parties or interest in the matter to be resolved. Such a pro-
ceeding would be difficult to defend when one considers that the par-
ties had never lived in Washington as husband and wife, that in fact
Mrs. Ways was living in Virginia with the couple's children, and that
the only conceivable interest of Washington in the marriage would
have been based upon the petitioner's ninety-day presence under mili-
tary orders.
Opposing this argument is the fundamental problem at hand, that
is, the inability of service members to obtain a dissolution of marriage
when stationed outside their state of domicile. In the following part, a
proposed solution to this problem, emphasizing the use of choice of
law concepts in dissolution proceedings, will be discussed.
III. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO DISSOLUTION
JURISDICTION
The following analysis is an attempt to better accommodate the
legal doctrines and policy considerations that underlie dissolution ju-
risdiction. This analytical model is based on the premise that the pre-
sent judicial approach to dissolution jurisdiction, typified by the Ways
decision, fails to separate the issues of due process, full faith and
credit, and choice of law.74 Accordingly, each of these issues will be
considered separately. Finally, the model will be applied to the Ways
fact situation, with the result compared to that achieved by the court
in Ways.
73. See notes 92-105 and accompanying text infra.
74. In his dissent in Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 965
(1954), Judge Hastie stated:
The due process question in divorce jurisdiction which we have to decide is
whether it is fair for a state and its courts to adjudicate the merits of a petition
for the dissolution of a particular marriage. The problem of the full faith and
credit cases is to what extent a second state must subordinate its notions of policy
about a marital matter in which it wants to have a voice to what a sister state
has already decided.
Id. at 684. Judge Hastie further suggested that the domicile rule has led to a failure on
the part of the courts to recognize that jurisdiction and choice of law are distinct
problems. Id. at 685. The suggested approach presented here is based on Judge Hastie's
analysis. Many others, however, have discussed the adoption of an approach to dis-
solution jurisdiction roughly paralleling that presented here. See, e.g., Seidelson, Inter-
est Analysis and Divorce Actions, 21 BuFF. L. REV. 315 (1972); Sumner, supra
note 37; von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 43; Developments in the Law--State-
Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 966-76 (1960); 58 MICH. L. REv. 128(1959).
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A. Due Process and Convenience of the Forum
As previously explained, a variety of factors have led the courts and
commentators to view jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage as sui ge-
neris.75 Dissolution of marriage has not been defined as an in per-
sonam action,7 6 and consequently many of the due process considera-
tions that have developed in conventional in personam jurisdiction
75. See notes 17-28 and accompanying text supra.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) discusses judicial juris-
diction under three general topics: jurisdiction over persons (§§ 24-55), jurisdiction
over things (§§ 56-68), and jurisdiction over status (§§ 69-79). Jurisdiction over
status is in turn divided into titles covering jurisdiction for divorce, jurisdiction to
entertain other marital suits, jurisdiction for adoption, and jurisdiction over custody.
Other than the requirement of notice and opportunity to be heard, the Restatement
presents no general rules covering jurisdiction over status. This absence of broad
doctrinal statements reflects the fact that the state courts have developed a separate
jurisdictional analysis for each of the various actions affecting status. The evolution
of these distinct jurisdictional rules can be directly related to the unique policy con-
siderations associated with each of these adjudications of status.
76. The need to protect the interest of the state in the marital relations of its
domiciliaries is most often cited as the reason for not treating divorce as an in per-
sonam action. See notes 40-43 and accompanying text supra. A central inquiry here
is the extent to which the present approach to divorce jurisdiction serves to frustrate
rather than to protect this interest. See notes 86-89 and accompanying text infra.
Professor Ehrenzweig has pointed out that treating dissolution of marriage as an
ordinary in personam action "could, on the one hand, trap a defendant on a pleasure
or business trip in a state with a hospitable divorce law; and, on the other hand, force
the plaintiff to hunt his opponent all through the country to serve him with process."
A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 237 (1962). The first of these
objections would be met with the application of choice of law principles. See notes
92-105 infia. As for the service of process problem, an increasing number of states
are amending their long-arm statutes to include coverage of domestic relations issues.
See Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460 (Okla. 1970); Mitchim v. Mitchim. 518
S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1975); Comment, State Court Jurisdiction: The Long-Arm Reaches
Domestic Relations Cases, 6 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1021 (1975); Note. Long Arm
Jurisdiction in Alimony and Custody Cases, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 289 (1973). Cf. In re
Miller, 86 Wn. 2d 712, 548 P.2d 542 (1976); In re Marriage of Dunkley, 15 Wn. App.
775. 551 P.2d 1394 (1976).
As part of the recently enacted Uniform Parentage Act of 1976. the Washington
long-arm statute was amended to include "the act of sexual intercourse within this
state with respect to which a child may have been conceived" as the basis for the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident party. Ch. 42. § 22. 1975-76
Wash. Laws 2d Ex. Sess. 176 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.185(e) (1976)).
The Washington legislature is currently considering legislation proposing that the
state's long-arm statute. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.185 (1976). be amended to include
the following additional ground for exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident:
(e) Living in a marital relationship within this state notwithstanding subsequent
departure from this state, as to all proceedings authorized by chapter 26.09 RCW.
so long as the petitioning party has continued to reside in this state or has con-
tinued to be a member of the armed forces stationed in this state.
S.B. 2291, 45th Wash. Legis. (1977) (identical proposals in H.B. 180 and H.B. 410).
This proposed amendment was drafted by and introduced at the request of the Wash-
ington Judicial Council. Interview with Karl Tegland. Staff Attorney. Washington
Judicial Council. in Seattle, Washington (Feb. 10, 1977).
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have not been applied to divorce actions.77 Similarly, the doctrine of
forum non conveniens has not been considered when a court decides
whether to hear a dissolution action. Nonetheless, the due process
concept of fundamental fairness and the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens seem especially relevant to the divorce jurisdiction question.
First, the considerations of fundamental fairness demanded by due
process would require a court to consider the position of the respon-
dent spouse.78 Under the prevailing analytical approach the courts are
completely petitioner-oriented, there being no requirement that the
court consider the relation of the nonpetitioning spouse to the forum
state.79 This approach tends to deny the equal interest of the respon-
dent spouse in the matter to be adjudicated, i.e., the continuation or
77. See Leflar, supra note 51, at 50; Rodgers & Rodgers, supra note 37, at 1364,
1390; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 43, at 1129-33; Developments in the Law-
State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 74, at 97 1.
Service of process by publication is authorized in divorce cases under the terms of
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.100(4) (1976). See also id. § 26.09.010(l); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 69 (1971).
78. The leading Supreme Court decisions on judicial jurisdiction are Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945);
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); and Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235 (1958). Analyzing these decisions and their application to the state's
long-arm statute, the Washington Supreme Court announced the following three fac-
tors that must coincide ifjurisdiction is to be entertained:
(1) The nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must purposefully do some
act or consummate some transaction in the forum state; (2) the cause of action
must arise from, or be connected with, such act or transaction; and (3) the
assumption of jurisdiction by the forum state must not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice, consideration being given to the quality,
nature, and extent of the activity in the forum state, the relative convenience of
the parties, the benefits and protection of the laws of the forum state afforded the
respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation.
Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 62 Wn. 2d 106, 115-16, 381 P.2d 245,
251 (1963). See Trautman, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction in Washington,
51 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1975).
Further support for the application of these due process concepts to dissolution
actions may lie in the Washington Supreme Court's decision in Ace Novelty Co. v.
M. W. Kasch Co., 82 Wn. 2d 145, 508 P.2d 1365 (1973). In deciding whether the
exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction was appropriate, the court applied the due process
standards established for in personam jurisdiction. As Professor Trautman notes,
"[c] ertainly onb reading of the opinion is that if a defendant is not subject to in
personam jurisdiction, as through the long-arm statute, he may not be reached through
a quasi in rem analysis." Trautman, supra at 30. This analysis of the Ace Novelty
decision supports the general proposition that the due process standards established
for in personam actions may be more broadly applied to the spectrum of judicial
actions.
79. It should be remembered that personal jurisdiction over both spouses is re-
quired to settle ancillary matters such as child custody, support, and property rights.
See note 27 supra. But see Simons v. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank, 381 U.S. 81
(1965) (dower right extinguished by ex parte divorce decree).
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termination of the parties' marital status.80
Second, the doctrine of forum non conveniens, as applied in in per-
sonam actions, requires a court to consider the convenience of the
forum to all the parties. 81 Once again the present practice in dissolu-
tion actions is not to look beyond the petitioner, disregarding the
equal interest of the respondent spouse. This often presents the nonpe-
titioning spouse with what has been termed "the unpalatable option
either of appearing in the action to contest the merits, very likely at
great expense and inconvenience, or of suffering an uncontested de-
fault judgment destroying completely the marital relation.182 Further-
more, this failure to consider the convenience of the forum is incon-
sistent with the public policy favoring the preservation of marriages. 83
It seems anomalous to provide for counseling and other marriage-
saving procedures without also providing for some inquiry into
whether the respondent will be able to participate.
The fundamental question here is whether a forum should be sup-
plied to determine the viability of our most basic social institution.
Given the repercussions of such a determination, the courts should
consider the relation of the forum state to both parties. Any time the
forum state is not the domicile of both spouses, the court should fur-
80. Some commentators have argued that the absent spouse does not have a pro-
tectable interest in the proceeding, on the premise that termination of the marital
status does not deprive one of a viable right. See Comment. Divorce Ex Parte Style,
33 U. CHI. L. REV. 837. 840 (1966). Professor Currie argues that society cannot
force people to live together and that an ex parte decree terminates a marriage that
exists in name only. Currie, supra note 27, at 29. The first argument seems to overlook
the effect of status termination on such rights as that of inheritance; and the latter
might be answered by arguing that whether the marriage is viable is best determined
by a procedure that affords a reasonable opportunity for participation by both spouses.
81. After tacit recognition of the doctrine in Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel
Prods., Inc., 62 Wn. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245 (1963), the Washington Supreme Court
expressly embraced the doctrine of forum non conveniens in Werner v. Werner. 84
Wn. 2d 360, 526 P.2d 370 (1974). The court stated:
The doctrine of forum non conveniens contemplates the discretionary declina-
tion of jurisdiction where, in the court's view, the difficulties of litigation militate
for the dismissal of the action subject to a stipulation that the defendant submit
to jurisdiction in a more convenient forum.
Id. at 370, 526 P.2d at 377-78. See also R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS 154-60 (1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84
(1971).
82. Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 74, at 973.
83. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.030(3)(b) (1976) (Dissolution Act provisions
authorizing transfer of dissolution actions to family court or referral to counseling
service); id. ch. 26.12 (Family Court Act). Family court jurisdiction may be invoked
"for the purpose of preserving the marriage by effecting a reconciliation between the
parties or for amicable settlement of the controversy between the spouses so as to
avoid further litigation over the issue involved." Id. § 26.12.100.
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ther inquire into the actual existence of the relation between person
and place upon which jurisdiction must be based.84 Whatever connec-
tion is found to exist must be weighed against any evidence of prob-
able unfairness or inconvenience. The result of this balancing process
should be a decision on whether to supply a forum that more nearly
meets the requirements of due process.85
B. Recognition
As previously noted, the domicile requirement has been defended
on the ground that it serves to protect the interest of each state in the
marital status of its domiciliaries.86 Under the Williams decisions the
full faith and credit clause requires recognition to be given when juris-
diction is based on the domicile of one of the parties.87 This rule, plus
the failure to consider choice of law in divorce actions, 88 results in a
proceeding that completely ignores the interest that any jurisdiction
other than the forum state may have in the proceeding.8 9
Fundamental here is the relation of the forum state to the contro-
versy at handY0 The prevailing approach is to define this relation in
only one way-the domicile of one party, or in the case of R.C.W. §
26.09.030, the presence of an armed forces member in the state for
ninety days. This is often an inadequate measure of the actual inter-
ests at stake, especially when children, property, and the nonpeti-
tioning spouse may well be located outside the forum state.
84. The American Law Institute states:
A distinction may ultimately be drawn between situations where both spouses are
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the divorce court and where there is juris-
diction over only one spouse. One or more jurisdictional bases may be found
adequate for the granting of a divorce in the first situation and inadequate in the
second.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 72, Comment b (1971). This state-
ment appears to take into consideration the suggested balancing approach.
85. This conclusion is based in part on the assumption that a court utilizing this
due process analysis will also take into consideration choice of law issues. See notes
92-105 and accompanying text infra. The due process decision, i.e., whether supplying
a forum meets the tests of fairness and convenience, must be separated from the
choice of law decision. The latter determination, involving the choice of which social
policy to apply to the matter, must be based on contacts more significant than those
required to supply a forum. See Rodgers & Rodgers, supra note 37, at 1390-92; Seidel-
son, supra note 74, at 319.
86. See notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra.
87. See notes 35-37 and accompanying text supra.
88. See notes 92-105 and accompanying text infra.
89. See Stimson, supra note 51, at 225; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 43,
at 1131.
90. See note 74 supra.
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Recognition of a dissolution decree should hinge upon actual re-
spect for the interest of other states in the proceeding. This test would
force the original forum to decide what actual interest or justification
it has for applying its social policy to the marriage. Such a decision
would be based upon all the relevant factors, including where children
and property are located, where the parties lived as husband and wife,
and where the repercussions of terminating the marriage will fall.
Applying this expanded analysis, a court may well decide that an-
other state has a greater interest in the matter. Under the existing judi-
cial approach there is no effective mechanism, other than the refusal
of jurisdiction, allowing for the accommodation of this greater in-
terest. Denying jurisdiction, however, may in effect leave many parties
without a remedy. This class of persons would include those discrimi-
nated against by the domicile requirement, including service mem-
bers. 91 A possible solution to this problem is supplying a forum, but
employing a choice of law rule in deciding what social policy to
apply.
C. Choice of Law
The failure to consider choice of law in marriage dissolution ac-
tions92 appears to be a result of the traditional doctrinal approach to
dissolution jurisdiction-in rem jurisdiction based on domicile as the
situs of the marital status or res. 93 This development has also been
explained in terms of policy:
Upon the stability of the home and the security of the family might be
said to depend much of the social and economic stability of the entire
society. Because of this integral relationship, a domiciliary state
claims a powerful interest in seeing that if the marriages of its citizens
are to be severed at all, they should be severed only in its own courts
and in accordance with its own law. 94
91. See note 47 supra. See also Developments in the Law--Ste-Court Jurisdiction,
supra note 74, at 976.
92. As Professor Currie notes, "[o] utside the swamp of divorce, it is common for
a disinterested forum to entertain an action based on foreign law." Currie. supra note
27. at 48. See also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 43, at 1129 (examples of
other types of actions in which choice of law has not been considered).
93. See Rieke, supra note 14. at 380 n.23; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 43.
at 1177; Comment. Jurisdiction Versus "Choice-of-Law" in Divorce Actions, 25
ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 51 (1952).
94. Developments in the Lawt-State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 74, at 968.
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These rationales, however, overlook the demonstrated frustration of at
least one state's social policy when the forum state is not the domicile
of both spouses. 95 Moreover, the absence of choice of law has encour-
aged forum shopping,96 collusion,97 and perjury98 in divorce actions.
The major obstacle to the adoption of a choice of law rule in disso-
lution actions is the lack of any single standard that can be applied
successfully in every case.99 The commentators have considered var-
ious relationships, but their lack of agreement suggests the need for a
more flexible standard. 100
It is submitted that the answer may lie in the adoption of an ap-
proach similar to that used in contract actions. Marriage has often
been characterized as a civil contract,101 and although the analogy
should not be extended too far, 10 2 there are sufficient similiarities to
95. See notes 52 & 61 and accompanying text supra.
96. See Currie, supra note 27, at 26; Developments in the Law--State-Court
Jurisdiction, supra note 74, at 973.
97. See Currie, supra note 27, at 55-56. As Professor Currie points out, under the
rule in Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948), a husband and wife can obtain a
"virtually unchallengeable divorce on grounds not recognized by their home state."
Currie, supra note 27, at 55.
98. See note 52 supra. For a discussion of the lawyer's ethical problem in this
context, see A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 21, at 242.
99. Professor Currie lists the following factors that may weigh against the adop-
tion of choice of law in dissolution actions: (1) the loss of expertise of specialized
courts in the "home" state; (2) discrepancies between theory and practice, including
the problem of divorce laws that give judges discretion to issue decrees where cause
is shown; (3) lack of adequate safeguards for the state's policy of preserving mar-
riages; and (4) the unavailability of conciliation services provided for under some
state divorce laws. Professor Currie further states that a state might decide to express
a policy opposing the application of its divorce laws in foreign courts. Currie, supra
note 27, at 51-53. See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 81, at 194; Developments in the
Law--State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 74, at 969.
These commentators seem to overlook the ease with which divorce seeking parties
can completely evade the application of the domestic policy of their domiciliary state.
For a more complete analysis, reaching the conclusion that a disinterested forum
could adopt formal choice of law rules for the determination of both status termina-
tion and the award of alimony, see Seidelson, supra note 74.
100. See, e.g., Stimson, supra note 51, at 294-95 (discussing as possible rule of
reference the law of the place where cause of action arose); Sumner, supra note 37,
at 20-22 (law of the place where the wrong was committed, law of the matrimonial
domicile, and law of the place of marriage); Comment, supra note 93, at 55 (law of
the place where wrong occurred). Certainly the suggestion of using the law of the
place of the wrong, or of the place where the cause of action arose, is inappropriate
under more recent divorce laws with "no-fault" grounds. See note 19 supra.
101. For a discussion of the concept of marriage as a contract, see Rieke, supra
note 14, at 375-77. For samples of premarital contracts, including provisions for
future ownership of property, support, expectations of the marriage, and arbitration
provisions, see Sheresky & Mannes, A Radical Guide to Wedlock, SATURDAY REVIEW,
July 29, 1972, at 33; Ms., June 1973, at 63-64, 102-03.
102. The primary distinction is the role of the state, which for reasons of public
policy controls the formation and dissolution of the contractual relation, as well as
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justify the application of similar choice of law rules.
The Washington Supreme Court has adopted 103 the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws rule that contract rights and duties
should be determined by the law of the state that has "the most signifi-
cant relationship to the transaction and the parties."' 04 The Restate-
ment lists several standards that a court might consider in deciding the
issue, 105 and it would not appear difficult to translate these standards
into analogous contacts in the context of the marital relationship. For
instance, place of contracting would become place of marriage, and
place of performance would become place where the parties lived to-
gether as husband and wife. The Restatement also calls for the consid-
eration of the respective domicile or residence of each party, and this
could easily be expanded to include consideration of the location of
children and property.
D. An Application of the Suggested Analysis
In order to test this suggested approach to dissolution actions, the
fact situation presented in Ways will be used.106 It will be assumed,
however, that the petitioner had remained stationed in Washington an
additional twenty-six days, thus satisfying the statutory requirements.
The court would first be forced to decide whether to supply a
forum. This decision would be based on a balancing of the factors rel-
evant to fairness and convenience, as measured by the relative relation
of each party to the forum. A factor in favor of supplying a forum
would be the petitioner's status on active military duty in the state,
including consideration of the difficulties encountered by members of
imposing obligations on the parties once the marital relation is established. See Rieke.
supra note 14, at 375-77. See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190. 210 (1888) (quot-
ing Chief Justice Marshall that marriage contract is not within meaning of constitu-
tional provision prohibiting impairment of contractual obligations).
103. Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 70 Wn. 2d 893, 425 P.2d
623 (1967). See also Werner v. Werner, 84 Wn. 2d 360, 526 P.2d 370 (1974) (exten-
sion of "most significant contacts" approach to tort case); Potlatch No. I Fed. Credit
Union v. Kennedy, 76 Wn. 2d 806, 459 P.2d 32 (1969) (application of "'most signifi-
cant contacts" test to suretyship contract). See generally Powers, Formalism and
Nonformnalisn in Choice of Law Methodology, 52 WASH. L. REV. 27 (1976).
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(l) (1971).
105. The Restatement lists five factors: the place of contracting; the place of nego-
tiation of the contract; the place of performance; the location of the subject matter of
the contract; and the domicile, residence, nationality, and place of business of the
parties. Id. § 188(2).
106. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
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the armed services when attempting to establish a domicile where sta-
tioned.' 07 Factors weighing against supplying- a forum would include
the great inconvenience of the forum for Mrs. Ways, taking into con-
sideration the hardships of providing for the care of the couple's chil-
dren, possibly arranging for absence from work, and financing the
costs of traveling to and remaining in Washington. A deciding factor,
however, might be the nature of the petitioner's military duty in
Washington. The record indicates that Ways remained in Washington
less than five months and did not establish any significant relation to
this state. 108 On this basis a court might well conclude that the due
process concerns of fairness and convenience argued against supplying
a forum.
Assuming arguendo that the court decided in favor of supplying a
forum, the next inquiry would center upon the relative interest of this
or any other state in the marriage to be dissolved. Clearly Washing-
ton's interest in the marriage would be found to be slight, the presence
of the petitioner in the state for ninety days providing little justifica-
tion for the application of Washington's social policy. Resorting to the
recommended choice of law rule, the court would almost certainly
conclude that Virginia had "the most significant relation to the trans-
action and the parties," and that a decree of dissolution based on
Washington law would threaten Virginia's predominant interest in the
marriage.
It might be argued that the Washington court would encounter dif-
ficulties in applying an unfamiliar divorce law. The divorce laws,
however, have become increasingly uniform,' 0 9 and the problem of
unfamiliarity is common to all choice of law actions. Furthermore, the
petitioner's inability to return to Virginia to pursue the action in Vir-
ginia courts must be considered.
Either disposition of the case under this method of analysis would
appear to be preferable to the probable result under the prevailing
approach. A decision not to supply a forum would reflect a conclusion
that the petitioner's tenuous relation to the state did not outweigh the
unfairness and inconvenience to the respondent. Moreover, assuming
107. See note 47 supra.
108. 85 Wn. 2d at 694, 538 P.2d at 1226; Brief of Appellant at 1-2; Brief of
Respondent at 1.
109. See note 19 supra.
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a decision to supply a forum, the action would be decided under the
law of that state having the greatest interest in the marriage.110
IV. CONCLUSION
The Washington legislature and supreme court should be com-
mended for attempting to overcome the discriminatory effect of the
domicile requirement on divorce-seeking service members. In this re-
gard the court's acceptance of an alternative jurisdictional basis for
dissolution actions is certainly a significant step. The Ways decision,
however, evidences the continuing influence of judicial experience
with the domicile requirement, with the court failing to analyze ade-
quately the due process, full faith and credit, and choice of law issues
involved in dissolution actions.
Adoption of the analytical method suggested here would admittedly
be without precedent in American courts. Divorce laws, however,
have changed dramatically in recent years, and there is a strong need
for the courts to work a similar change in the prevailing jurisdictional
analysis. Until such a change occurs, Washington courts acting under
R.C.W. § 26.09.030 may often be guilty of what the Supreme Court
has termed "officious intermeddling in matters in which another State
has a paramount interest." '11 1
Bruce A. Robertson
110. It might be argued that the adoption of this suggested analysis will result in
the application of repressive, fault-oriented divorce statutes in favor of the more pro-
gressive Washington law. Certainly this is a valid concern, but it must be balanced
against a realization that the present approach frustrates the purposes of both personal
autonomy and valid state interests in the dissolution action. Personal autonomy is
hardly served by an analytical approach that completely ignores the interest of the
respondent spouse in the dissolution proceedings. Furthermore, it seems difficult to
justify the application of Washington's social policy when this state will not be forced
to contend with any of the consequences of dissolving the marriage. Finally, the solu-
tion to repressive social policies should be based upon statutory reform rather than
defective jurisdictional analyses.
Ill. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 407 (1975).
394
Vol. 52: 369, 1977
